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Abstract Alongside citizens’ belief in the legitimacy of democracy, public support
for the political regime is crucial to the survival of (democratic) political systems.
Yet, we know fairly little about the relationship between citizens’ democratic knowl-
edge and their evaluation of democratic performance from a global comparative per-
spective. In this article, we argue that the cognitive ability of citizens to distinguish
between democratic and authoritarian characteristics constitutes the individual yard-
stick for assessing democracy in practice. Furthermore, we expect that the effect
of citizens’ democratic knowledge on their evaluation of democratic performance
is moderated by the institutional level of democracy. We test these assumptions by
combining data from the sixth and seventh wave of the World Values Survey and the
third pre-release of the European Values Study 2017, resulting in 114 representative
samples from 80 countries with 128,127 respondents. Applying multilevel regres-
sion modeling, we find that the higher a country’s level of democracy, the more
positive the effect of democratic knowledge on citizens’ assessment of democratic
performance. In contrast, we find that the lower the level of democracy in a country,
the more negative the effect of citizens’ democratic knowledge on their evaluation
of democracy. Thus, this study shows that citizens who are more knowledgeable
about democracy are most cognitively able to assess the level of democracy in line
with country-level measures of democracy. These results open up new theoretical
and empirical perspectives for related research on support for and satisfaction with
democracy as well as research on democratization.
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Was beeinflusst die individuelle Bewertung der Performanz der
Demokratie? Die Interaktion zwischen dem demokratischen Wissen der
Bürgerinnen und Bürger und dem institutionellen Niveau der
Demokratie
Zusammenfassung Die zentralen Werte und Normen, die das Überleben eines
(demokratischen) politischen Systems sichern, sind neben dem Glauben der Bürge-
rinnen und Bürger an die Legitimität der Demokratie ihre öffentliche Unterstützung
für das politische Regime. Allerdings wissen wir aus einer vergleichenden globalen
Perspektive noch recht wenig über die Beziehung zwischen dem demokratischen
Wissen der Bürgerinnen und Bürger und ihrer Einschätzung der demokratischen
Performanz. In diesem Artikel argumentieren wir, dass die kognitive Fähigkeit der
Bürgerinnen und Bürger, zwischen demokratischen und autoritären Merkmalen zu
unterscheiden, den individuellen Maßstab für die Beurteilung der Demokratie in der
Praxis darstellt. Wir erwarten zudem, dass der Effekt des demokratischen Wissens
der Bürgerinnen und Bürger hinsichtlich ihrer Bewertung der demokratischen Per-
formanz durch das institutionelle Niveau der Demokratie moderiert wird. Wir testen
diese Annahmen unter Verwendung von Individualdaten aus der sechsten und sieb-
ten Welle des World Values Survey und des dritten pre-release der European Values
Study 2017, woraus 114 repräsentative Stichproben aus 80 Ländern mit insgesamt
128.127 Befragten resultieren. Basierend auf der Anwendung von Mehrebenenmo-
dellen kommen wir zu dem Ergebnis, dass der Einfluss des demokratischen Wissens
auf die Bewertung der demokratischen Performanz durch die Bürgerinnen und Bür-
ger umso positiver ist, je höher das Niveau der Demokratie eines Landes ist. Im
Gegensatz dazu stellen wir fest, dass sich das demokratische Wissen der Bürgerin-
nen und Bürger umso negativer auf ihre Einschätzung der Demokratie auswirkt, je
niedriger das Niveau der Demokratie in einem Land ist. Mit dieser Studie zeigen
wir folglich, dass Bürgerinnen und Bürger, die über mehr Wissen über die Demo-
kratie verfügen, kognitiv am ehesten in der Lage sind, das Niveau der Demokratie
in Übereinstimmung mit Bewertungen der Demokratie auf der Länderebene zu be-
urteilen. Die Ergebnisse eröffnen darüber hinaus neue theoretische und empirische
Perspektiven für die verwandte Forschung zur Unterstützung und Zufriedenheit mit
der Demokratie sowie zur Demokratisierung.
Demokratie · Politische Kultur · Regimeunterstützung · Demokratisches Wissen ·
Mehrebenenmodelle · Cross-level Interaktion
1 Introduction
Recent developments indicate that democracy is facing challenges across the world.
While some established democracies are backsliding due to the erosion of liberal
principles such as civil liberties and the rule of law (Abramowitz and Repucci 2018;
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Mechkova et al 2017; Repucci 2020; Schenkkan and Repucci 2019), governmental
attacks on the media and freedom of expression are accelerating and deepening the
third wave of autocratization (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019; Lührmann et al 2019;
Maerz et al 2020). These developments are accompanied by the global rise of (right-
wing) populist parties and authoritarian leaders that embody alternative concepts of
democracy and oppose fundamental liberal principles and democratic procedures
(Galston 2018; Heinisch and Wegscheider 2020; Huber and Schimpf 2017; Mudde
2007; Norris and Inglehart 2019; Pappas 2016; Plattner 2019).
Studies on the global support for democracy highlight the uncertain future of
democractic governance and raise the question whether democracy is (still) “the only
game in town” (Linz and Stepan 1996, 15): Recent research suggests that citizens’
support for democracy has declined, while openness to illiberal and authoritarian
alternatives has increased (Foa and Mounk 2016, 2017a,b; Global Barometer Surveys
2018; Howe 2017). These findings are particularly worrying in light of evidence that
indicates that public support for democracy helps democracy to survive (Claassen
2020), while a lack of democratic support and openness to illiberal and authoritarian
alternatives is associated with democratic backsliding (Foa and Mounk 2019).
Alongside citizens’ belief in the legitimacy of democracy, however, public support
for the political regime is crucial to the survival of (democratic) political systems
(Easton 1965, 1975; Norris 1999, 2011; Pickel 2016). Yet, several long-term trends
and observations indicate high levels of distrust towards political institutions and
dissatisfaction with their democratic performance (Armingeon and Guthmann 2014;
Crozier et al 1975; Dalton 2004; Global Barometer Surveys 2018; Klingemann
1999; Norris 2011; Pharr and Putnam 2000; Wike and Fetterolf 2018). While some
scholars argue that this lack of regime support is an expression of a growing assertive
and critical citizenry with higher expectations and demands on political institutions
(Dalton and Welzel 2014; Norris 1999, 2011; Welzel 2013), others argue that it is
rooted in a lack of belief in fundamental principles of democracy and a widespread
openness to illiberal and authoritarian alternatives among younger cohorts (Foa and
Mounk 2016, 2017a,b, 2019).
At the heart of this discussion lies the question which democratic norms and val-
ues citizens have internalized through their political socialization, thus constituting
their democratic knowledge, and how this understanding of democracy affects their
evaluation of their country’s political regime. This question is particularly important
given that substantial gaps between citizens’ democratic knowledge and perceived
democratic practice may foster potential pro- or anti-democratic mobilizations (Stark
2019; Welzel and Klingemann 2008). However, besides a few studies focusing pri-
marily on established democracies in Europe (Ferrín 2016; Heyne 2019b;Markowski
2016; Pickel 2016, 2017; Torcal and Trechsel 2016; Weßels 2016), we know fairly
little about the relationship between citizens’ democratic knowledge and their eval-
uation of democratic performance from a global comparative perspective.
In this article, we argue that citizens’ democratic knowledge constitutes the indi-
vidual yardstick for assessing democracy in practice. In other words, we expect that
the extent to which citizens are cognitively able to distinguish between democratic
and authoritarian characteristics entails different evaluations of political institutions.
This argument is based on the assumption that citizens’ support for political objects
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is rooted in a certain understanding of democracy which is the result of the political
socialization process (Pickel 2016). In this case, the understanding of democracy
is operationalized through citizens’ knowledge of the academic distinction between
democratic and authoritarian regime principles. Accordingly, we expect that the ex-
tent of citizens’ democratic knowledge affects whether and to what extent they are
satisfied with the level of democracy provided by the country.
However, we further argue that citizens tend to evaluate democracy in their coun-
try more positively if political institutions meet their knowledge about democracy.
We therefore anticipate that the effect of citizens’ democratic knowledge on their
evaluation of democratic performance is moderated by the institutional level of
democracy. While we expect the effect of democratic knowledge on citizens’ as-
sessment of democratic performance to be more positive the higher a country’s level
of democracy, we assume the effect to be more negative the lower a country’s level of
democracy. Accordingly, our research question is how citizens’ democratic knowl-
edge and the institutional level of democracy affect their evaluation of democratic
performance?
To answer this research question, the remainder of this article is structured as
follows: First, we give a brief overview of the importance of citizens’ assessment
of democracy within the concept of political support and explain why it is essential
to consider citizens’ democratic knowledge and the institutional level of democracy.
After presenting our hypotheses, we operationalize the theoretical concepts using
data from the sixth and seventh wave of the World Values Survey and the third
pre-release of the European Values Study 2017. Using data from 114 representative
samples of 80 countries with a total of 128,127 respondents, we test our hypotheses
by applying multilevel regression modeling. In the final section, we conclude with
important theoretical and empirical considerations for further research.
2 Theoretical Framework
In this article, we argue that citizens’ evaluation of democratic performance is signif-
icantly shaped by their democratic knowledge and that this relationship is moderated
by their country’s level of democracy. To highlight the relevance of this assumption
for political culture research, we begin by locating citizens’ assessment of democ-
racy within the concept of political support. In a second step, we explain the need
to consider the knowledge of democracy that citizens have acquired during their
political socialization, since this specific understanding of democracy is considered
the foundation of support for the political system (Pickel 2016). In a final step, we
outline how the relationship between citizens’ democratic knowledge and their eval-
uation of democracy is influenced by their country’s level of democracy. We assume
that citizens who have a distinct knowledge of democracy but live under different
political regimes hold different perceptions of how democratic their country is. The
following section provides a framework for this study and outlines our assumptions.
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2.1 Political Support and Citizens’ Assessment of Democratic Performance
The significance of people’s political attitudes and values for the stability of political
systems has been theorized in detail since the civic culture study by Almond and
Verba (1963). Accordingly, the persistence of a political system is largely deter-
mined by citizens’ cognitive, affective and evaluative orientations towards political
objects. Easton defines these orientations as political support, “an attitude by which
a person orients himself to an object either favorably or unfavorably, positively or
negatively” (Easton 1975, 436). However, a political object only receives support if
it corresponds to the value orientations and attitudes as well as the expectations and
knowledge of the people (Pickel 2016). While citizens may have positive or negative
views towards political authorities and the political community, public support for
the political regime and belief in the legitimacy of democracy are crucial for the
survival of (democratic) political systems (Claassen 2020).
Regime support is frequently measured using citizens’ satisfaction with or evalua-
tion of the democratic performance, as these indicators are available in most surveys
and therefore well suited for comparative studies (Dalton 2004; Klingemann 1999;
Martini and Quaranta 2020; Norris 1999, 2011; Torcal and Montero 2006). Sev-
eral studies have shown that while these indicators tap into multiple dimensions
of political support and also cover the evaluation of non-democratic aspects (e.g.
economic wealth), they still provide an acceptable measure for citizens’ assessment
of democracy (Canache et al 2001; Ferrín 2016; Linde and Ekman 2003; Quaranta
2018). Thus, these indicators provide an evaluation of the extent to which demo-
cratic institutions and their functioning in practice meet the preferences of citizens.
These preferences for democracy are shaped by the knowledge about fundamental
principles, institutions and procedures associated with the concept of democracy that
people acquire in the course of their political socialization. Accordingly, democratic
knowledge refers to the cognitive dimension of attitudes towards democracy, which
is synonymous with the understanding of democracy (Shin and Kim 2018). Citi-
zens’ assessment of democracy should therefore be considered in the light of their
knowledge about democratic procedures.
Despite this explicit connection, only few studies consider the gap between atti-
tudes towards democracy and democratic practice when explaining citizens’ satis-
faction with or evaluation of democratic performance (Ferrín 2016; Heyne 2019b;
Markowski 2016; Torcal and Trechsel 2016; Weßels 2016). Overall, the results show
that citizens’ attitudes towards democracy significantly influence their evaluation
of democracy in their country. However, these studies mainly refer to established
democracies in Europe, which significantly reduces the variance in the level of
democracy at the country level. As a result, we still know fairly little about the rela-
tionship between citizens’ democratic knowledge and their assessment of democratic
performance within different institutional settings ranging from highly democratic
to authoritarian regimes.
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2.2 The Concept of Democratic Knowledge
As Galston argues, democracies “require democratic citizens, whose specific knowl-
edge, competences, and character would not be as well suited to nondemocratic
politics” (Galston 2001, 217). Yet alongside good education, literacy and access to
free media, the type of political regime and its historical development of democracy
in particular give rise to distinctive democratic knowledge and competences among
citizens (Cho 2014, 2015; Kirsch and Welzel 2019; Kruse et al 2019; Norris 2011;
Welzel 2013; Welzel and Alvarez 2014). Accordingly, what people know about
democracy is closely linked to the process of political socialization, because “polit-
ical knowledge, behavioral norms, and cultural values are acquired from formative
experiences occurring during earliest childhood through adolescence and beyond”
(Norris 2011, 143–144). Hence, the yardstick by which citizens evaluate democratic
institutions does not only depend on the acquired democratic knowledge, but also
on the democratic or authoritarian context in which this knowledge was conveyed.
While ordinary citizens may lack knowledge about what constitutes a democ-
racy, political scientists have established distinct criteria that characterize demo-
cratic regimes. The normative core of every procedural definition of democracy is
determined by the integrity of the electoral process (Diamond and Morlino 2005;
Ferrín and Kriesi 2016a; Held 2006; Norris 2014). A representative democracy can
only generate legitimacy among its citizens if the electoral competition is protected
by additional measures aimed at accountability and responsiveness (Bühlmann and
Kriesi 2013). Proceeding from this electoral dimension, the concept of democracy
can be expanded by a liberal, social or direct dimension if certain elements such as
the rule of law and civil liberties, protection against poverty or direct popular par-
ticipation are included (Coppedge et al 2011; Ferrín and Kriesi 2016a; Hernández
2016; Kriesi et al 2016).
While some scholars argue that these concepts of democracy are too complex
and controversial to be clearly identified by ordinary citizens (Schaffer 1998), oth-
ers add the methodological criticism that attitudes towards democracy are in general
difficult to measure with surveys (Converse 2006). Furthermore, the mere focus on
democratic principles is criticized since citizens only really know about democ-
racy if they are cognitively able to identify authoritarian principles as undemocratic
(Schedler and Sarsfield 2007; Schmitter and Karl 1991). In contrast to Ferrín and
Kriesi (2016b) or Heyne (2019b), who measure support for the electoral, liberal,
social and direct dimensions of democracy, we thus focus on citizens’ democratic
knowledge as their cognitive ability to distinguish democratic from authoritarian
regime principles. This ties in with previous research, according to which citizens
are knowledgeable about democracy only if they are also able to recognize and reject
authoritarian regime characteristics (Cho 2014, 2015; Kirsch and Welzel 2019; Nor-
ris 2011; Welzel 2013; Welzel and Alvarez 2014). Furthermore, this simplification
allows us to examine knowledge about democracy from a cross-cultural perspective
that covers the entire spectrum from highly democratic countries to authoritarian
regimes.
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2.3 The Interaction of Citizens’ Democratic Knowledge and Institutional Level
of Democracy
In addition to citizens’ knowledge about democracy, previous research emphasized to
consider the influence of macro-level factors on the evaluation of democracy. Thus,
recent studies show that the individual assessment of democracy largely depends on
a country’s historical experience with democracy (Kruse et al 2019; Heyne 2019b,a;
Norris 2019), the number of parties (Berggren et al 2004), the quality of government
(Martini and Quaranta 2020) and the economic performance (Daoust and Nadeau
2020; Pennings 2017).
Despite these findings, only few studies have examined causes of citizens’ assess-
ment of democracy outside established (Western) democracies and have included
non-Western democracies and authoritarian regimes. In addition, the institutional
level of democracy has rarely been considered as a moderating variable. Conse-
quently, we consider the level of democracy across different democratic and author-
itarian regimes, which enables us to examine to what extent a country’s level of
democracy meets citizens’ democratic knowledge and whether this influences their
evaluation of the democratic performance. This further allows us to assess the extent
to which citizens’ evaluation of democracy results from a gap between democratic
knowledge and democratic practice.
To sum up, we argue that the cognitive ability of citizens to distinguish between
democratic and authoritarian characteristics constitutes their individual yardstick
for the evaluation of democratic performance in their country. Yet, citizens should
be more likely to support the political regime in their country, the more the level
of democracy corresponds to their knowledge of democracy. This implies that the
evaluation of democracy is also determined by the institutional framework, and that
citizens with high knowledge of democracy should be most cognitively able to assess
the level of democracy in line with country-level measures of democracy. Citizens
with high levels of democratic knowledge should therefore evaluate democracy in
their country higher in highly democratic countries, as these political regimes are
most likely to meet their knowledge about democracy. In contrast, citizens with
a high level of democratic knowledge should evaluate democracy lower the more
authoritarian a country is, since this increases the gap between democratic knowledge
and democratic practice. Accordingly, we expect the effect of democratic knowledge
on citizens’ assessment of democratic performance to be more positive the higher a
country’s level of democracy (H1), while we expect the effect to be more negative the
lower a country’s level of democracy (H2).
3 Data and Methods
We test these hypotheses by combining survey data from the sixth and seventh wave
of theWorld Values Survey (WVS) (Haerpfer et al 2020; Inglehart et al 2014) and the
third pre-release of the European Values Study (EVS) 2017 (EVS 2020). The WVS
and EVS use a common questionnaire and include representative samples from al-
most one hundred countries, making it the largest cross-national survey project on
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Table 1 Measuring Democratic Knowledge
Theoretical
dimension
Item Factor
1 2
Democratic
regime
principles
People choose their leaders in free elections 0.812 –0.053
Women have the same rights as men 0.789 –0.047
Civil rights protect people from state oppression 0.789 0.058
Authoritarian
regime
principles
The army takes over when government is incompetent –0.052 0.770
Religious authorities ultimately interpret the laws –0.159 0.763
People obey their rulers 0.221 0.712
Explained Variance 33% 28%
Eigenvalue 1.981 1.692
Cronbach’s ˛ 0.72 0.61
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) 0.67
Respondents (N) 128,127
Notes: Results are from a principal component analysis with oblique rotation (“promax”) using the psych
package in R. Parallel analysis suggests two components.
people‘s value orientations and attitudes. The most recent surveys1 are particularly
well suited as they contain questions both on citizens’ assessment of their country’s
democratic performance and on their cognitive skills to distinguish between demo-
cratic and authoritarian characteristics. In addition, the combination of these surveys
allows covering respondents from the whole range of highly democratic countries
such as Sweden, New Zealand, Uruguay and Germany to authoritarian regimes like
Nicaragua, Tajikistan, Libya and Rwanda. Given that some countries are included
in both the sixth and the seventh wave of the WVS or the EVS 2017, we use the
year in which the survey was conducted as a suffix (country-year) for unique identi-
fication. After deleting observations with missing values for the variables of interest
described below, the final data include 114 representative samples from 80 coun-
tries with a total of 128,127 respondents. Table 3 in the Appendix lists all country
samples included in the analysis.
Table 4 in the Appendix provides further information on all variables used in
our analyses, such as question wording and coding. We normalize all variables
within a range from 0 to 1.0 to allow for comparison of coefficients and simplify
the interpretation of our analyses. The dependent variable is citizens’ assessment of
their country’s democratic performance and thus their individual perception of the
functioning of democratic institutions in practice. We measure this evaluation by the
extent to which respondents indicate how democratically their country is governed,
on a ten-point scale ranging from not at all democratic (0) to completely democratic
(1.0).
The main explanatory variable is citizens’ democratic knowledge and thus their
cognitive abilities to distinguish democratic from authoritarian regime principles. As
outlined in the theoretical section, we expect that the extent of democratic knowledge
provides the individual yardstick for the evaluation of the functioning of democratic
1 While the sixth wave of the WVS was conducted between 2010 and 2014, the seventh wave of the WVS
and the third pre-release of the EVS 2017 cover the years 2017 to 2020.
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institutions in practice. We measure citizens’ democratic knowledge using the six
indicators summarized in Table 1. Respondents are asked how essential they con-
sider each characteristic for democracy2 on a ten-point scale from not an essential
characteristic of democracy (0) to an essential characteristic of democracy (1.0)3.
Drawing on previous research (Kirsch and Welzel 2019; Norris 2011; Welzel 2013;
Welzel and Alvarez 2014), we assign three characteristics each to either democratic
or authoritarian regime principles: While we consider free elections, gender equality
and the protection of people through civil rights to be essential democratic princi-
ples, we assign preferences for a military coup, a theocratic regime and an obedient
society to authoritarian regime principles.
The results of the principal component analysis, as presented in Table 1, con-
firm the theoretical dimensions of democratic and authoritarian regime principles.
We measure citizens’ democratic knowledge using their cognitive ability to distin-
guish between these democratic and authoritarian characteristics. For this purpose,
we first calculate an additive index, measuring knowledge of democratic regime
principles by adding the values of the three indicators for each respondent and nor-
malizing the resulting index between 0 and 1.0. Here the value of 1.0 indicates the
respondent’s ability to identify all three democratic regime principles as essential
characteristics for democracy. In contrast, we add the inverted values of the three
authoritarian characteristics and normalize the index between 0 and 1.0, with 1.0
representing a comprehensive knowledge of authoritarian regime principles as non-
essential characteristics of democracy. Following the logic of non-compensatory in-
dex construction (Wuttke et al 2020)4, we multiply both indices. This results in an
index of citizens’ democratic knowledge between 0 and 1.0, where 1.0 indicates a
comprehensive knowledge about democratic principles as essential characteristics
for democracy and of authoritarian regime principles as non-essential characteristics
of democracy. When interpreting this index, it should be noted that this index only
reflects citizens’ cognitive ability to distinguish between democratic and autocratic
characteristics. Evaluating authoritarian characteristics as essential for democracy
does not necessarily mean that citizens support them, but rather that they lack
democratic knowledge5.
In addition, we include a number of control variables that we consider impor-
tant for the individual assessment of democratic performance. We use general life
2 The exact wording of the question is as follows: Many things are desirable, but not all of them are
essential characteristics of democracy. Please tell me for each of the following things how essential you
think it is as a characteristic of democracy.
3 In the seventh wave of the WVS and the EVS 2017, the category it is against democracy (0) was addi-
tionally coded. In order to compare the questions across countries, we recoded all values of 0 into 1 (not
an essential characteristic of democracy).
4 We prefer a multiplicative index because we argue that low knowledge of authoritarian regime principles
as non-essential characteristics of democracy cannot be compensated by high knowledge about democratic
ones. As a robustness test, we perform the analysis using an additive combination of indicators. As shown
in Tables 6 and 8, results remain substantially the same.
5 In contrast to Kirsch and Welzel (2019), we refrain from using the term liberal (notions of) democ-
racy because we believe that the employed items are too thin to measure a concept as complex as liberal
democracy.
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satisfaction and household income as proxies for the evaluation of the perceived
effectiveness and general performance of a country. We measure general life satis-
faction on a ten-point scale ranging from completely dissatisfied (0) to completely
satisfied (1.0) and household income on a ten-point scale from lowest income group
(0) to highest income group (1.0). For political ideology, we use the self-positioning
on a ten-point scale from left (0) to right (1.0). We measure cognitive skills using
political interest on a four-point scale from not at all interested (0) to very inter-
ested (1.0) and the highest educational level on a nine-point scale from no formal
education (0) to university-level education with degree (1.0). We also control for the
gender and age of respondents.
To measure a country’s level of democracy, we rely on data from the tenth version
of the Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem) (Coppedge et al 2020; Pemstein
et al 2020). V-Dem takes into account the multidimensionality of the concept of
democracy (Coppedge et al 2011) and provides indices based on multiple indicators
and sub-components coded by country experts, thereby reducing the measurement
error (Teorell et al 2019). We use the liberal democracy index (v2x_libdem), which
measures a country’s level of democracy on a scale from low (0) to high levels of
liberal democracy (1.0). This index takes into account the extent to which electoral
principles such as freedom of association and expression, universal suffrage and
free and fair elections are implemented (v2x_polyarchy), as well as compliance
with liberal principles such as the rule of law and protection of individual and
minority rights (v2x_liberal). We use the value of the liberal democracy index for
the year in which the survey was conducted in the respective country. For those
countries surveyed in 2020, we use the value of the liberal democracy index from
2019. As an additional robustness test and to control for short-term fluctuations, we
measure the level of democracy using the arithmetic mean of the values for the year
in which the survey was conducted and the four previous years6.
We test our hypotheses by applying multilevel regression modeling. This method
has the advantage that it takes into account the hierarchical structure of our data
from respondents nested in countries (Hox 2010; Steenbergen and Jones 2002). Ap-
plying multilevel modeling allows us to analyze the expected different slopes in the
relationship between democratic knowledge and citizens’ assessment of democratic
performance. Most importantly, it enables us to test our hypotheses about the cross-
level interaction between democratic knowledge and the level of democracy. We
provide further information such as descriptive statistics (Table 5) and distributions
of the variables measuring citizens’ assessment of democratic performance (Fig. 3),
democratic knowledge (Fig. 4) and level of democracy (Fig. 5) in the Appendix.
4 Empirical Analysis
Using the described data, measurements and methods, we analyze in this section
how democratic knowledge and the level of democracy interact in influencing citi-
zens’ assessment of democratic knowledge. We begin by analyzing the shape of the
6 As shown in Tables 7 and 8, results remain substantially the same.
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Fig. 1 Bivariate relationship between assessment of democratic performance and democratic knowledge.
Notes: Darker areas in the scatterplots illustrate higher clustering of observations. Black lines visualize
linear regression. Country samples are labelled with ISO-3 country codes
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Table 2 Multilevel Regression Models Explaining Citizens’ Assessment of Democratic Performance
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Individual level
(Intercept) 0.56*** 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.36***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Democratic knowledge –0.01** –0.01 –0.01
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Life satisfaction 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Left-right scale 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Political interest 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Education –0.01*** –0.02*** –0.02***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Income 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Gender (female) 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Country level
Level of democracy 0.18*** 0.06 0.16***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Cross-level interaction
Level of democracy X 0.30***
Democratic knowledge (0.04)
AIC 22857.55 17964.23 16442.76 16410.28
BIC 22886.83 18081.36 16579.41 16556.69
Log Likelihood –11425.78 –8970.11 –8207.38 –8190.14
Observations 128,127 128,127 128,127 128,127
Groups (country-year) 114 114 114 114
Random effects
Var: Intercept (country-year) 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
Var: Residual 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Var: Democratic knowledge 0.02 0.01
Notes: Results are unstandardized regression coefficients of restricted maximum likelihood (REML) mul-
tilevel regression models with standard errors in parentheses using the lme4 package in R. All models
include random intercepts (country-year). Models 3 and 4 include random slopes for democratic knowl-
edge. Variables for level of democracy and democratic knowledge are grand-mean centered. Intraclass
correlation coefficient (ICC) for the null model (Model 1) is 0.195. Random effects from Model 4 are
shown in Fig. 6 for the intercept and in Fig. 7 democratic knowledge. Samples are weighted according to
known population distributions.
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.
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relationship between citizens’ democratic knowledge and their evaluation of democ-
racy. As outlined in the theoretical section, we expect this relationship to be either
positive or negative, depending on a country’s level of democracy. Specifically, we
hypothesized that the higher a country’s level of democracy, the more positive is
the effect of citizens’ democratic knowledge on their assessment of democratic per-
formance (H1). In contrast, we expect the effect to be more negative the lower the
level of democracy of a country (H2).
Figure 1 illustrates the bivariate relationship for a sample of forty countries. The
eight countries in each of the five rows represent a group with a comparable level of
democracy: While the first row comprises the eight countries with the lowest level
of democracy in our data, the last row covers the most democratic countries. The
row in the center shows the bivariate relationship for the eight countries grouped
around the average level of democracy. The second and fourth rows show the eight
countries grouped by minus and plus one standard deviation from the mean level of
democracy.
The scatterplots show remarkable differences across countries in the relationship
between citizens’ knowledge of democracy and their assessment of democratic per-
formance. For the countries in the first two rows with comparatively low levels
of democracy, we observe mainly negative correlations. Accordingly, citizens with
high democratic knowledge living in more authoritarian regimes seem to evaluate the
democratic performance more negatively. In the sample of countries with a medium
level of democracy, we also find rather negative correlations, although less clear and
with a flattening effect. In contrast, we find mainly positive relationships for the
countries in the last two rows with comparatively high levels of democracy. Hence,
citizens with a high level of democratic knowledge in highly democratic countries
seem to evaluate democratic performance more positively. Alongside initial descrip-
tive evidence for our assumptions, the differences in intercepts and slopes illustrate
the importance of multilevel modeling for testing our hypotheses.
We follow a stepwise approach in building nested models to ensure that each
more complex model adds substantial explanatory power. Table 2 summarizes the
results of our analysis. Model 1 represents the null model and only includes the
varying intercepts at the country level. The intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC)
is 0.195, which means that about 19% of the variance at the individual level can be
explained by country level differences. Model 2 includes all independent variables,
while we add a random slope for democratic knowledge in Model 3, which allows us
to take into account the differences in the relationship between citizens’ democratic
knowledge and their assessment of democratic performance. In the final Model 4,
we also add the cross-level interaction between citizens’ democratic knowledge and
a country’s level of democracy. All the following substantive interpretations refer to
our final Model 4.
The first thing to note is that we do not find a general effect of democratic
knowledge on citizens’ evaluation of democracy. When we include the random
effect for democratic knowledge in Model 3 and thus control for the different slopes
of the effect between countries, the effect turns out to be not significant. In other
words, we find no evidence that there is an effect of democratic knowledge on
citizens’ assessment of democratic performance that is independent of a country’s
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Fig. 2 Cross-Level Interaction between Level of Democracy and Democratic Knowledge. Notes: Left-
hand figure (a) shows the estimated coefficients (marginal effects) of democratic knowledge on assessment
of democratic performance dependent on different levels of democracy. Right-hand figure (b) shows the
predicted values of assessment of democratic performance at different levels of democratic knowledge
(x-axis) and levels of democracy (+1 standard deviation of the mean level of democracy; mean level of
democracy; -1 standard deviation of the mean level of democracy). Coefficients are from Model 4 in
Table 2 with 95% confidence intervals
level of democracy. However, we find a significant positive effect of the level of
democracy. The higher the level of democracy of a country, the higher citizens
evaluate its democratic performance. In terms of effect sizes, a citizen living in the
most democratic country rates the democratic performance on average about 0.16
points higher than someone living in the most authoritarian country included in our
data. Thus, citizens across the globe seem to be quite well aware of how democratic
their country really is. Indeed, they seem to be able to judge the level of democracy
in their country based on the freedoms and opportunities it provides, although there
are significant differences in accuracy between citizens (Kruse et al 2019).
Our main argument is that these differences can be explained by citizens’ demo-
cratic knowledge, which provides the individual yardstick for evaluating the func-
tioning of democratic institutions in practice. According to this, citizens assess the
democratic performance of their country based on their knowledge of democracy
in relation to the perceived level of democracy. Consequently, citizens with a high
democratic knowledge should be more likely to hold positive views about democ-
racy in their country within a highly democratic context, whereas they should have
a more negative view of the political institutions within an authoritarian context.
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The significant positive coefficient of the cross-level interaction between citizens’
democratic knowledge and their country’s level of democracy confirms our hypothe-
ses. Accordingly, a person with high democratic knowledge in the most democratic
country in our data evaluates the democratic performance on average about 0.3
points higher than a person with high democratic knowledge in the most authori-
tarian country. We visualized the effects of the cross-level interaction in Fig. 2 to
facilitate the interpretation. As the left-hand figure (2a) shows, the estimated ef-
fect of democratic knowledge becomes more positive the higher a country’s level
of democracy. Accordingly, citizens who are knowledgeable about democracy rate
the democratic performance in their country more positively the higher the actual
level of democracy (H1). While we find no significant effect of democratic knowl-
edge around the mean level of democracy, the estimated coefficient of democratic
knowledge becomes more negative the lower a country’s level of democracy. Cor-
respondingly, citizens with the cognitive abilities to distinguish between democratic
and authoritarian regime principles evaluate the democratic performance of their
country lower the more authoritarian it is (H2).
These results are further verified by the predicted values of the assessment of
democratic performance shown in the right-hand figure (2b) of Fig. 2. For citizens
living in countries with an above-average level of democracy, the assessment of
democratic performance turns out to be higher with increasing democratic knowl-
edge (H1). In contrast, citizens living in countries with a below-average level of
democracy rate democracy in their country lower with increasing democratic knowl-
edge (H2). As stated before, we find no significant effect of democratic knowledge
for countries with an average level of democracy. Depending on the specific process
of democratization or autocratization that these regimes are facing, it seems likely
to find both positive and negative effects in this group of countries, resulting on
average in a null effect.
Another important finding is that the level of democracy appears to make no
difference at all for citizens who are less aware about democracy. Thus, we find that
citizens with a lack of democratic knowledge evaluate democracy in their country
regardless of the context in which they live. This raises an important question for
further research, namely the criteria by which citizens who are less aware of democ-
racy assess the democratic performance of their country. Furthermore, this study
also shows that citizens who are knowledgeable about democracy are most cogni-
tively able to assess the level of democracy in line with country-level measures of
democracy (Pickel et al 2016). These results open up new theoretical and empirical
perspectives for related research on support of and satisfaction with democracy as
well as research on democratization.
5 Conclusion
We analyzed in this study how democratic knowledge and the level of democracy
interact in influencing citizens’ assessment of democratic performance. We started
from the point that both citizens’ belief in the legitimacy of democracy and their
support for the political regime are crucial to the survival of a (democratic) politi-
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cal system. Our main argument was that the cognitive ability of citizens to distin-
guish between democratic and authoritarian characteristics constitutes the individual
yardstick for the assessment of democracy in practice and that this relationship is
moderated by the institutional level of democracy.
Our results show that citizens’ evaluation of democracy varies significantly de-
pending on their democratic knowledge and their country’s level of democracy. We
find that the more authoritarian the regime, the more negative the evaluation of
democratic performance by people who are more knowledgeable about democracy.
In contrast, we find that the more democratic the regime, the more positive is the
assessment of democracy by people with high democratic knowledge. These results
show that citizens who are knowledgeable about democracy are most cognitively
able to assess the level of democracy in line with country-level measures of democ-
racy.
The results are less clear in regimes located between highly democratic and
authoritarian regimes. For these countries, we find on average no significant effect
of citizens’ democratic knowledge on their evaluation of democracy. This is quite
reasonable from an empirical perspective, given that this group includes both positive
and negative effects, which on average results in a null effect. From a theoretical
perspective, it seems likely that unstable or changing political conditions also lead
to different effects of democratic knowledge on the evaluation of democracy among
the population. Further research should address not only the question of what kind
of understanding of democracy prevails among citizens in these regimes, but also
the resulting political consequences.
Hence, our results provide some important theoretical and empirical implications
for further research. First, they prepare the ground for further research on the legit-
imacy and stability of authoritarian regimes. Follow-up studies could examine the
mechanisms between democratic knowledge and regime support within authoritar-
ian regimes in more detail (e.g. Kirsch and Welzel 2019). Second, further studies
could look more closely at cohort effects within countries. Older cohorts that were
socialized under a more authoritarian regime can be expected to have different eval-
uations of political institutions than younger generations that grew up in a more
democratic context. Third, the use of time series data can be used to study changes
in the effect of democratic knowledge on regime support due to changes in the level
of democracy. If the effect of democratic knowledge on regime support changes as
a result of the democratization or autocratization of a country, this has far-reaching
consequences for the mobilization of pro- and anti-democratic movements (Stark
et al 2017; Stark 2019; Welzel and Klingemann 2008). This brings us to a fourth
possible application for party competition and electoral behavior: If political parties
can mobilize voters based on a certain conception of democracy, and if this is a
sufficient reason for people to support these parties, this represents both a potential
and a threat to democratization.
Following the topic of this special section on measuring meanings of democracy,
further reflection is needed on how to measure citizens’ attitudes towards democracy
from a global comparative perspective. While we focus on the cognitive dimension
of citizens’ attitudes towards democracy, and thus a certain understanding of democ-
racy, its theoretical and empirical relationship to specific preferences for democratic
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procedures is still under-researched. While this requires a systematic review of the
theoretical concepts and terms, taking into account available empirical items and
scales (e.g. Shin and Kim 2018), it allows further advances and important insights
for this field of comparative politics.
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Appendix
Table 3 Country Coverage and Sample Sizes
Country (year) Respondents (N) Country (year) Respondents (N)
Albania (2018) 879 Algeria (2014) 459
Argentina (2013) 708 Argentina (2017) 672
Armenia (2011) 525 Armenia (2018) 1160
Australia (2012) 961 Australia (2018) 1523
Austria (2018) 1199 Azerbaijan (2011) 1001
Azerbaijan (2018) 889 Bangladesh (2018) 1176
Belarus (2011) 1416 Belarus (2018) 760
Bolivia (2017) 1583 Bosnia and Herzegovina (2019) 1178
Brazil (2014) 1011 Brazil (2018) 902
Bulgaria (2017) 868 Chile (2012) 542
Chile (2018) 572 Colombia (2012) 1073
Colombia (2018) 1498 Croatia (2017) 1034
Cyprus (2011) 776 Cyprus (2019) 254
Czech Republic (2017) 1010 Denmark (2017) 1544
Ecuador (2013) 1120 Ecuador (2018) 1042
Estonia (2011) 1082 Estonia (2018) 675
Ethiopia (2020) 556 Finland (2017) 940
France (2018) 1309 Georgia (2014) 688
Georgia (2018) 1254 Germany (2013) 1731
Germany (2018) 2967 Ghana (2012) 1552
Greece (2017) 884 Haiti (2016) 1596
Hong Kong (2014) 928 Hong Kong (2018) 1840
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Table 3 (Continued)
Country (year) Respondents (N) Country (year) Respondents (N)
Hungary (2018) 964 Iceland (2017) 1302
India (2012) 3353 Indonesia (2018) 2621
Iraq (2013) 888 Italy (2018) 1176
Japan (2010) 1012 Japan (2019) 675
Kazakhstan (2011) 1500 Kyrgyzstan (2011) 1401
Lebanon (2013) 757 Libya (2014) 1184
Lithuania (2018) 734 Malaysia (2012) 1299
Malaysia (2018) 1300 Mexico (2012) 1765
Mexico (2018) 1482 Montenegro (2019) 378
Morocco (2011) 177 Netherlands (2012) 1259
Netherlands (2017) 540 New Zealand (2011) 476
New Zealand (2020) 658 Nicaragua (2020) 870
Nigeria (2012) 1759 Nigeria (2018) 1100
North Macedonia (2019) 547 Norway (2018) 978
Pakistan (2012) 1124 Palestine (2013) 659
Peru (2012) 892 Peru (2018) 1050
Philippines (2012) 1185 Philippines (2019) 1199
Poland (2012) 639 Poland (2017) 778
Romania (2012) 955 Romania (2018) 1386
Russia (2011) 1129 Russia (2017) 1887
Rwanda (2012) 1527 Serbia (2018) 1511
Slovakia (2017) 793 Slovenia (2011) 613
Slovenia (2017) 678 South Africa (2013) 2839
South Korea (2010) 1147 South Korea (2018) 1245
Spain (2011) 821 Spain (2017) 647
Sweden (2011) 991 Sweden (2017) 1016
Switzerland (2017) 2705 Taiwan (2012) 1012
Taiwan (2019) 1219 Tajikistan (2020) 1189
Thailand (2013) 1088 Thailand (2018) 994
Trinidad and Tobago (2010) 451 Tunisia (2013) 583
Tunisia (2019) 950 Turkey (2012) 1374
Ukraine (2011) 1500 United Kingdom (2018) 1372
United States (2011) 1988 United States (2017) 2047
Uruguay (2011) 664 Yemen (2014) 198
Zimbabwe (2012) 1500 Zimbabwe (2020) 1090
Notes: Table shows the number of respondents in each country sample after excluding observations with
missing values for the variables of interest.
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Table 4 Variables, Question Wording and Original Coding
Variables Question wording Original coding
WVS7 WVS6 EVS
Q251 V141 v143 How democratically is this country
being governed today?
Ten-point scale: 1 (Not at all democratic) –
10 (Completely democratic)
Q242 V132 v134 Religious authorities ultimately
interpret the laws
Ten-point scale: 1 (Not an essential
characteristic of democracy) – 10 (An
essential characteristic of democracy)
Q243 V133 v135 People choose their leaders in free
elections
Q245 V135 v137 The army takes over when govern-
ment is incompetent
Q246 V136 v138 Civil rights protect people from state
oppression
Q248 V138 v140 People obey their rulers
Q249 V139 v141 Women have the same rights as men
Q49 V23 v39 How satisfied are you with your life
as a whole these days?
Ten-point scale: 1 (Completely dissatisfied)
– 10 (Completely satisfied)
Q240 V95 v102 In political matters, people talk
of “the left” and “the right.” How
would you place your views on this
scale, generally speaking?
Ten-point scale: 1 (Left) – 10 (Right)
Q199 V84 v97 How interested would you say you
are in politics?
Four-point scale: 1 (Very interested) – 4 (Not
at all interested)
Q275 V248 v243 Highest educational level Nine-point scale: 1 (No formal education) –
9 (University-level education, with degree)
Q288 V239 v261 Household income Ten-point scale: 1 (Lowest group) – 10
(Highest group)
Q260 V240 v225 Gender 1 (Male); 2 (Female)
Q262 V242 v226 Age 16 – 103
Notes: WVS7 World Values Survey Wave 7, WVS6 World Values Survey Wave 6, EVS European Values Study 2017. All
variables are normalized for the analyses within a range from 0 to 1.0. The variable concerning political interest is inverted
from low to high political interest.
Table 5 Descriptive Statistics
Variable N Mean SD Median Minimum Maximum
Individual level
Assessment of democratic
performance
128,127 0.57 0.28 0.67 0.00 1.00
Democratic knowledge 128,127 0.47 0.27 0.43 0.00 1.00
Life satisfaction 128,127 0.68 0.24 0.67 0.00 1.00
Left-right scale 128,127 0.51 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00
Political interest 128,127 0.48 0.32 0.33 0.00 1.00
Education 128,127 0.53 0.28 0.50 0.00 1.00
Income 128,127 0.44 0.25 0.44 0.00 1.00
Gender (female) 128,127 0.51 0.50 1.00 0.00 1.00
Age 128,127 0.32 0.20 0.30 0.00 1.00
Country level
Level of democracy 114 0.52 0.26 0.54 0.06 0.89
Notes: N Number of respondents, SD Standard deviation.
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Table 6 Robustness check using an additive index of democratic knowledge
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Individual level
(Intercept) 0.56*** 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.36***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Democratic knowledge (additive index) 0.01* 0.02 0.02
(0.00) (0.02) (0.02)
Life satisfaction 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Left-right scale 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Political interest 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Education –0.02*** –0.02*** –0.02***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Income 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Gender (female) 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Country level
Level of democracy 0.18*** 0.03 0.15***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Cross-level interaction
Level of democracy X 0.42***
Democratic knowledge (additive index) (0.07)
AIC 22857.55 17966.18 16376.31 16349.80
BIC 22886.83 18083.31 16512.96 16496.21
Log Likelihood –11425.78 –8971.09 –8174.15 –8159.90
Observations 128,127 128,127 128,127 128,127
Groups (country-year) 114 114 114 114
Random effects
Var: Intercept (country-year) 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
Var: Residual 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Var: Democratic knowledge (additive
index)
0.04 0.03
Notes: Results are unstandardized regression coefficients of restricted maximum likelihood (REML) mul-
tilevel regression models with standard errors in parentheses using the lme4 package in R. All models
include random intercepts (country-year). Models 3 and 4 include random slopes for democratic knowl-
edge. Variables for level of democracy and democratic knowledge are grand-mean centered. Intraclass
correlation coefficient (ICC) for the null model (Model 1) is 0.195. Samples are weighted according to
known population distributions.
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.
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Table 7 Robustness check using five-year arithmetic mean of level of democracy
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Individual level
(Intercept) 0.56*** 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.36***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Democratic knowledge –0.01** –0.01 –0.01
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Life satisfaction 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Left-right scale 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Political interest 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Education –0.01*** –0.02*** –0.02***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Income 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Gender (female) 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Country level
Level of democracy (five-year arith-
metic mean)
0.18*** 0.07 0.16***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Cross-level interaction
Level of democracy (five-year arith-
metic mean) X
0.27***
Democratic knowledge (0.04)
AIC 22857.55 17964.42 16441.92 16415.60
BIC 22886.83 18081.55 16578.57 16562.02
Log Likelihood –11425.78 –8970.21 –8206.96 –8192.80
Observations 128,127 128,127 128,127 128,127
Groups (country-year) 114 114 114 114
Random effects
Var: Intercept (country-year) 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
Var: Residual 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Var: Democratic knowledge 0.02 0.01
Notes: Results are unstandardized regression coefficients of restricted maximum likelihood (REML) mul-
tilevel regression models with standard errors in parentheses using the lme4 package in R. All models
include random intercepts (country-year). Models 3 and 4 include random slopes for democratic knowl-
edge. Variables for level of democracy and democratic knowledge are grand-mean centered. Intraclass
correlation coefficient (ICC) for the null model (Model 1) is 0.195. Samples are weighted according to
known population distributions.
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.
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Table 8 Robustness check using an additive index of democratic knowledge and five-year arithmetic
mean of level of democracy
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Individual level
(Intercept) 0.56*** 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.36***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Democratic knowledge (additive index) 0.01* 0.02 0.02
(0.00) (0.02) (0.02)
Life satisfaction 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Left-right scale 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Political interest 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Education –0.02*** –0.02*** –0.02***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Income 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Gender (female) 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Country level
Level of democracy (five-year arith-
metic mean)
0.17*** 0.04 0.15***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Cross-level interaction
Level of democracy (five-year arith-
metic mean) X
0.38***
Democratic knowledge (additive index) (0.07)
AIC 22857.55 17966.42 16375.75 16354.08
BIC 22886.83 18083.55 16512.40 16500.49
Log Likelihood –11425.78 –8971.21 –8173.87 –8162.04
Observations 128,127 128,127 128,127 128,127
Groups (country-year) 114 114 114 114
Random effects
Var: Intercept (country-year) 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
Var: Residual 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Var: Democratic knowledge (additive
index)
0.04 0.03
Notes: Results are unstandardized regression coefficients of restricted maximum likelihood (REML) mul-
tilevel regression models with standard errors in parentheses using the lme4 package in R. All models
include random intercepts (country-year). Models 3 and 4 include random slopes for democratic knowl-
edge. Variables for level of democracy and democratic knowledge are grand-mean centered. Intraclass
correlation coefficient (ICC) for the null model (Model 1) is 0.195. Samples are weighted according to
known population distributions.
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.
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Fig. 3 Distribution of Assessment of Democratic Performance. Notes: Black dashed line shows the mean
value of assessment of democratic performance
Fig. 4 Distribution of Democratic Knowledge. Notes: Black dashed line shows the mean value of demo-
cratic knowledge
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Fig. 5 Distribution of Level of Democracy. Notes: Black dashed line shows the mean value of level of
democracy
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Fig. 6 Random Effects of the Intercept. Notes: Coefficients are from Model 4 in Table 2 with 95%
confidence intervals. If the point estimate or the 95% confidence intervals cross the horizontal line drawn
at 0, the estimated coefficient is not significant. Blue points indicate a positive and red points a negative
effect
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Fig. 7 Random Effects of Democratic Knowledge. Notes: Coefficients are from Model 4 in Table 2 with
95% confidence intervals. If the point estimate or the 95% confidence intervals cross the horizontal line
drawn at 0, the estimated coefficient is not significant. Blue points indicate a positive and red points a
negative effect
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